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COMMENT ON YIN, REFORMING THE
TAXATION OF FOREIGN DIRECT
INVESTMENT BY U.S. TAXPAYERS
Reuven S. Avi-Yonah"
In this excellent article, George Yin addresses an important
proposal by the President's Advisory Panel on Federal Tax Reform.
The Advisory Panel proposed that the United States should
permanently switch from taxing the parent corporation of U.S.
multinationals on worldwide income to a modified territorial regime
under which dividends paid out of active business income would be
exempt from U.S. tax.' The Joint Committee on Taxation made a
similar recommendation.2
Why should we abandon the idea that U.S. taxpayers should be
taxed on all income "from whatever source derived," which has been
a fundamental building block of our tax system since 1913?' The basic
rationale for exempting dividends is based on Joel Slemrod's
observation that the efficiency of a tax should be measured by the
ratio of the revenue it collects to the behavioral change it induces in
taxpayers.4 In the case of the tax on dividends, the revenue collected is
small, because, as Jim Hines has shown, U.S. multinationals repatriate
only a small fraction of their overseas earnings. On the other hand,
the behavioral impact is large, as can be seen from Hines' data and
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even more vividly by the behavioral response to the one-year partial
amnesty from the dividend repatriation tax. The enactment of this
amnesty in 2004 resulted in over $300 billion in income being
repatriated.
In addition, dividend exemption offers some simplification
potential, because there will be no foreign tax credit available for
exempt earnings. Since the credit will only be available for income
that is in fact taxed by the United States (for example, under Subpart
F), and this income is typically subject to lower rates of tax overseas,
the credit will likely play a much more limited role, so the remaining
"baskets" could be consolidated. On the other hand, deductions
associated with exempt income will need to be limited, which will add
complexity. Overall, since the anti-deferral rules (Subpart F and
Passive Foreign Investment Company [PFIC]) will be retained, it is
not clear that the dividend exemption proposal is a significant move
toward simplification.
Another argument in favor of dividend exemption is that because
most of our trading partners exempt dividends from active income,
adopting the same rule helps our competitiveness. However, as
Michael Knoll has shown, the competitiveness argument depends on
some dubious assumptions (similar to those underlying the Unrelated
Business Income Tax).6 Moreover, the availability' of unlimited
deferral means that the current regime does not significantly affect
competitiveness.
The main argument against the proposal is that, like any move in
the direction of territoriality, it puts more pressure on the source rules
and on transfer pricing. Currently, U.S. multinationals considering
whether to shift income from the United States to foreign jurisdictions
know that getting it back into the United States means paying a price,
in the form of the dividend tax. The same data cited above show that
this constraint is real and that the phenomenon of "trapped income" is
significant. If we now abolish the tax on repatriation, U.S.
multinationals should have every incentive to shift even more income
overseas.
This issue would not be so problematic if our transfer pricing
regime effectively prevented income shifting. But as Kim Clausing
and I have shown, the current system is woefully inadequate for that
task.' This is illustrated by Table 2 in Yin's article, which shows high
6 Michael Knoll, Taxes and Competitiveness 11 (U. Pa. Inst. of Law & Econ.,
Research Paper No. 06-28, 2006), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=953074.
7 Reuven Avi-Yonah & Kimberly Clausing, Reforming Corporate Taxation in a
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concentrations of earnings and profits (E&P) in the Netherlands,
Ireland, Switzerland, and Luxembourg. The following data, which
show the top ten locations of profits of US multinationals in 2003, also
illustrate the inadequacy of the current regime:8
FIGURE 1:WHERE WERE THE PROFITS IN 2003?
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TABLE 1:EFFECTIVE TAX RATES OF SELECTED COUNTRIES











In a world in which a third of the foreign profits of U.S.-based
multinationals are in countries with effective tax rates of less than
10%, it seems dangerous to increase the incentive to shift profits by
Global Economy: A Proposal to Adopt Formulary Apportionment (The Brookings
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removing the one real disincentive to doing so: the knowledge that
repatriation would bear tax.
Yin recognizes that this is a real problem, and states that "one
modification Congress should consider is to require exempt income to
be subject to tax somewhere."9 The question is how to achieve this
goal, which I fully support, as it is consistent with what I call the
"single tax principle." 0 Yin proposes that we achieve this by applying
the dividend exemption only to countries with which we have tax
treaties. However, this would include a lot of jurisdictions with very
low effective tax rates (see Table 2, which includes in the list Austria,
Barbados, Cyprus, Ireland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and
Switzerland). Of the top ten destinations in Figure 1, only two
(Bermuda and the U.K. Islands) would not qualify for exemption
under this modification.
Therefore, if we are to adopt the exemption proposal, we must
grant exemptions only when the actual effective tax rate in the source
jurisdiction is high enough (for example, ninety percent of the U.S.
rate). This is consistent with what our trading partners do as well as
with the original intent of Subpart F." It should not pose
insurmountable administrability obstacles, since U.S. multinationals
already have to report both the current E&P and the actual tax paid
by each Controlled Foreign Corporation [CFC] (see Yin's Table 2). It
is similar to the "franking" mechanism that countries with dividend
imputation systems use to show that exempt dividends are paid out of
income that was in fact subject to corporate-level tax.
In the long run, however, neither the Advisory Panel nor Yin goes
far enough. The key question is whether U.S.-based multinationals are
sufficiently different from foreign-based multinationals to justify
taxing the former but not the latter on worldwide income. Even if we
adopt the dividend exemption proposal, we will still be taxing U.S.-
based multinationals differently; for example, only they will be subject
to Subpart F. The inversions saga illustrates that this will cause
pressure to shift parent corporations out of the United States. Given
the positive externalities associated with headquarters locations, this is
unfortunate.
Ultimately, the current distinction on the basis of where the
9 George K. Yin, Reforming the Taxation of Foreign Direct Investment by U.S.
Taxpayers, 2008 TNT 5-22 (Jan. 8, 2008).
10 REUVEN S. AvI-YONAH, INTERNATIONAL TAX AS INTERNATIONAL LAW 8-9
(2007).
1 Reuven Avi-Yonah, U.S. Notice 98-11 and the Logic of Subpart F. A
Comparative Perspective, 16 TAX NOTES INT'L 1797,1800 (June 8, 1998).
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parent is incorporated is obsolete. Corporations do not have
meaningful residency and therefore should be taxed purely on a
source basis. Moreover, distributions within multinational groups
(whether in the form of dividends, interest, royalties, or transfer
prices) are meaningless and should be ignored, and Subpart F should
be abolished.
If we adopt this view, it is clear that we need a better system for
establishing the source of income, or else all corporate income will be
shifted to low-tax jurisdictions. Therefore, I consider global formulary
apportionment the only regime appropriate for the 21st century.12
Luckily, because of the progress made within the EU on the Common
Consolidated Corporate Tax Base, the prospect that the OECD will
agree on a formula is not as far-fetched as it once seemed. In the long
run, pure source-based taxation of multinationals is the solution.
12 Avi-Yonah & Clausing, supra note 7, at 12-18.
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